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Abstract
In this paper we study the e↵ects that loss contracts—prepayments that can be clawbacked
later—have on group coordination when there is strategic uncertainty. We compare the
choices made by experimental subjects in a minimum e↵ort game. In control sessions,
incentives are formulated as a classic gain contract, while in treatment sessions, incentives
are framed as an isomorphic loss contract. Our results show that loss contracts reduce
the minimum e↵orts of groups and worsen coordination between group members, both
leading to lower payo↵s. However, these results depend strongly on the group’s gender
composition; groups with a larger proportion of women are better at coordinating and
exert more e↵ort.
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1 Introduction
Coordination lies at the center of most organizational settings. In those contexts, any
single member’s decision can impact the firm’s entire business process. This is apparent
in assembly lines or just-in-time inventory systems but also applies to other less obvious
settings, such as an advertising company with a shirking graphic designer or a restaurant
with an especially slow waiter.
In such organizational settings, having all subjects coordinate on a high e↵ort can
be complicated, as individuals face a trade-o↵: while exerting more e↵ort might result
in higher productivity, such e↵ort might be wasted if someone else along the chain (the
“weakest link”) is not keeping up to speed. One way to mitigate this coordination failure is
to increase the monetary benefits from coordination (Brandts and Cooper, 2006); yet, this
measure is expensive. A recent, popular, and cost-e↵ective suggestion to increase e↵ort
is the use of so-called loss contracts (e.g., Hossain and List, 2012), where individuals are
prepaid and then clawbacked if they do not meet certain productivity targets.
The intuition for the application of loss contracts rests on the presence of loss aversion:
since losses loom larger than gains, loss-averse individuals will work harder to avoid the
loss of a dollar than to gain an additional dollar (e.g., Hossain and List, 2012; Fryer Jr
et al., 2012; Imas et al., 2016). However, this intuition relies on a series of restrictive
assumptions. For example, most of the previous literature on loss contracts assumes that
higher levels of e↵ort guarantees a higher payo↵ or unambiguously reduces the probability
of a clawback. This assumption might hold for some individual decision-making situations
but is not realistic in many setups that require groups to coordinate. In a situation with
strategic uncertainty (e.g., when productivity relies on the weakest link), the interaction
between loss and risk aversion might backfire and induce individuals to exert lower e↵ort.
As shown in Pierce et al. (2020), if the e↵ort strategies of individuals cannot be
ordered following a first-order stochastic dominance criteria, then loss contracts might
have perverse e↵ects and drive individuals to reduce their e↵orts. The reason for this is
that when losses loom larger than gains, the uncertainty of outcome-related losses might
also loom larger than the potential gains, pushing individuals toward low e↵ort “loss-
minimizing” strategies. Armantier and Boly (2015) and De Quidt (2017) argue along
these same lines to provide conditions under which the introduction of loss contracts
might have ambiguous e↵ects on e↵ort provision.
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Against this background, we study how loss contracts a↵ect coordinated e↵orts within
groups when strategic uncertainty is present. To do so, we design a between-subject exper-
iment in which subjects play multiple rounds of the “minimum e↵ort game” (Van Huyck
et al., 1990), also known as the “weakest link” game (e.g., Knez and Camerer, 1994; Riedl
et al., 2016). As in a production chain, in this setup each subject’s payo↵ depends on
both her own e↵ort and the lowest e↵ort of all group members. To study the e↵ects of loss
contracts, we set up two treatments: a control group with a “classic” gain contract and
a treatment group with an isomorphic payo↵ function framed as a loss contract. Because
the only di↵erence between both treatments is the way in which the payo↵s are presented,
any change in subjects’ behavior can be attributed to the framing of the payo↵ function.
We find that loss contracts result in lower group productivity, with groups exerting a
lower minimum e↵ort than in sessions with gain contracts. We also find that loss contracts
worsen coordination among group members, which is reflected in a higher variance of the
e↵ort choices within the groups. This higher variance translates into a substantial amount
of wasted e↵orts (i.e., individual e↵orts exceeding the group minimum e↵ort) and therefore
translates into lower payo↵s across its members. Interestingly, our results show strong
gender e↵ects: groups with a larger proportion of women have higher levels of minimum
e↵ort, coordination, and payo↵s.
Our study contributes to the literature on the e↵ects of negatively framed incentives.
While this literature is rich in the e↵ect of loss contracts on individual worker e↵ort
(e.g., DellaVigna and Pope, 2018; Imas et al., 2016; Pierce et al., 2020), to the best of
our knowledge, only a few papers have studied the e↵ects that such contracts have on
group coordination. Hossain and List (2012) study the e↵ects of loss contracts on group
productivity in a field experiment and show that loss contracts have strong e↵ects on
group productivity. However, in their experiment there is no strategic uncertainty.1
In the lab, Cachon and Camerer (1996) study loss avoidance and forward induction
(implicit communication about subjects’ expectations) as an equilibrium selection re-
finement in median and minimum e↵ort games. Hamman et al. (2007) study the e↵ect
of imposing a penalty or bonus conditional on specified outcomes, while Brandts and
Cooper (2006) look at the e↵ect that a reduction in previous bonus payments has on co-
1As explained in page five of the article, a subset of groups worked around belt lines with a speed that
the group could alter or worked around guide rails with a fixed speed. It is unclear if strategic uncertainty
existed in the two remaining groups (G3 and G4), but the results for these groups are mixed.
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ordination. However, all of these laboratory experiments have di↵erent focuses, and with
several behavioral aspects at play they cannot determine the isolated e↵ects of negatively
framed incentives on group coordination. Our contribution is therefore to study the iso-
lated e↵ects of negatively framed incentives on group coordination and performance in a
controlled laboratory environment with strategic uncertainty.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our experimental design. Section
3 presents the experiment’s results, which are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental Design
We design a between-subject experiment with two treatments: a gain contract and a loss
contract. In both cases, subjects are divided into groups of six and simultaneously decide
how much e↵ort to exert in each given round. Subjects’ payo↵s are decreasing in their own
e↵ort and are increasing in the minimum e↵ort chosen across all subjects in the group.
Formally,
⇧(ei, emin) = aemin   bei + C, (1)
where ei is the e↵ort of subject i, emin is the minimum e↵ort across all subjects n in the
group, a and b are parameters such that a  b > 0, and C is a constant to avoid negative
payo↵s. The parametrization follows Van Huyck et al. (1990), with a = 20 points, b = 10
points, and C = 60 points. The exchange rate at the end of the experiment is e1 for
every 70 points, which is comparable to the rate in Engelmann and Normann (2010) and
Leng et al. (2018).
Our treatment is implemented through the framing of the payo↵s. In the gain contract
treatment, subjects are presented with the payo↵s resulting from equation (1), as depicted
in the left panel of Table 1. The vertical axis of the payo↵ table denotes the e↵ort choice
of an individual subject i. The horizontal axis denotes the smallest e↵ort level chosen
by all group members of subject i’s group. In the loss contract treatment, subjects are
endowed with 140 points before each round and are presented with the right panel of
Table 1. Importantly, this second table does not represent a subject’s final payo↵s but
the outcomes of all subjects’ joint actions. To calculate the payo↵s for each set of actions,
subjects need to subtract the resulting outcome from their per-round endowment of 140
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Gain Contract
Minimum Choice within Group
7 6 5 4 3 2 1
7 130 110 90 70 50 30 10
6 120 100 80 60 40 20
5 110 90 70 50 30
4 100 80 60 40




Minimum Choice within Group
7 6 5 4 3 2 1
7 –10 –30 –50 –70 –90 –110 –130
6 –20 –40 –60 –80 –100 –120
5 –30 –50 –70 –90 –110
4 –40 –60 –80 –100
3 –50 –70 –90
2 –60 –80
1 –70
Table 1: Payo↵ tables presented to subjects. In both cases, rows represent own e↵ort and columns
represent the group’s minimum e↵ort. The left panel shows the control treatment where subjects see
their final payo↵ in points, and the right panel shows the treatment table. Here, points are subtracted
from subjects’ initial endowment (140) and not from final payo↵s.
points.2 This is made clear in the instructions. In both treatments, subjects had several
practice rounds to get acquainted with the game’s interface and payo↵ structure.
In both tables the values presented are either all positive or all negative. We choose
this modeling device to avoid the creation of any focal points that may attract subjects’
attention and bias their behavior.3
The game is played for ten consecutive rounds, maintaining the same group composi-
tion. After each round, subjects receive feedback about the group’s minimum e↵ort and
the resulting payo↵. After the ten rounds, we elicit several personality traits from our
subjects. First we measure subjects’ cognitive ability using the CRT (Frederick, 2005),
CRT2 (Thomson and Oppenheimer, 2016), and eCRT (Toplak et al., 2014) questions.
Then we elicit their risk aversion, ambiguity aversion, and loss aversion through modify-
ing the multiple price lists used in Rubin et al. (2017). Finally, subjects answer the short
version of the Big Five personality traits suggested by Rammstedt and John (2007) and
state their gender.
The experiment was run at the Experimental Economics Laboratory of the Technische
Universität Berlin. We had eight sessions, four with gain contracts and four with loss
contracts. In each session we randomly divided subjects into 3 groups of 6 subjects for a
2The interface included a calculator in case any subject needed it.
3Cachon and Camerer (1996) show that in minimum e↵ort games with negative and non-negative
outcomes, the latter act as focal points. Consequently, subjects avoid losses by ignoring all strategies
that result in negative outcomes. Showing only positive or only negative entries allows us to exclude such
loss avoidance as potential equilibrium selection principle.
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total of 12 independent groups per treatment and 144 subjects across all sessions. Sessions
lasted less than one hour, with average earnings of e12.74. All subjects were recruited
through ORSEE (Greiner, 2015), and the experiment was programmed and conducted
using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
3 Results
Figure 1 summarizes the results across all sessions and groups. In it, we present the
minimum choice of each group in each period (thin gray lines) and the mean minimum
choice across groups in each period (thick red line). Contrary to the hypothesis of Hossain
and List (2012), the figure shows that a loss contract reduces the average minimum e↵ort of
groups. While a Mann-Whitney U test detects no significant e↵ect between the treatments
for initial period decisions (p-value = 0.325), there seem to be some di↵erences in the last
period (p-value = 0.082).
The di↵erences between treatments become more apparent once we look at the data
in a more disaggregate way. In Table 2 we use a random e↵ects model with the per-group
minimum e↵ort for each period as the dependent variable. In all cases we control for
the ratio of women per group (female ratio) as well as the average value of di↵erent
personality traits (e.g., avg risk aversion is the mean value of the risk aversion across all
subjects of a group). The results show that a loss contract has a negative e↵ect on the
minimum e↵ort of each group. This e↵ect is significant at the 5% level and is consistent
with the drop in e↵ort that we observe in Figure 1. Therefore from Table 2, we conclude
that a loss contract brings down the minimum e↵ort of groups.
Result 1: A loss contract results in a lower minimum e↵ort of groups.
Table 2 also shows that the groups’ gender composition has a strong e↵ect on the
minimum e↵ort. This statistically and economic significant e↵ect stands out from all
other group characteristics, except for extraversion, which has a negative e↵ect on groups’
minimum e↵ort.
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Gain Contract Loss Contract












Figure 1: Summary of all choices across treatments. For both treatments, the thin gray lines represent




loss contract –1.151⇤ –1.272⇤⇤
(0.691) (0.640)
female ratio 2.644⇤⇤ 3.857⇤⇤⇤
(1.163) (1.163)
avg risk aversion –0.279 –0.595⇤
(0.274) (0.317)
avg loss aversion –0.175 –0.342
(0.202) (0.259)
avg ambiguity aversion 0.00392 –0.0640
(0.303) (0.400)















Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Table 2: Random e↵ects GLS. All standard errors are clustered at the group level.
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3.1 Coordination
In this section we analyze how loss contracts a↵ect subjects’ coordination within groups.
To do so, in Table 3 we study the variance of the individual e↵ort levels within each group.
In Columns (1) to (3) we regress the variance of all e↵ort choices, across all rounds, for
each group (varagg in Table 3) on a set of controls using OLS. Again, the main control
variables are the ratio of women per group (female ratio) and the average value of the
di↵erent personality traits. In Columns (4) to (6) we use a random e↵ects model where
the dependent variable is the variance within each group for each period while controlling
for the composition of each group. The results are very similar for both models: a loss
contract results in higher variance in the e↵ort choices of subjects within groups.
Result 2: A loss contract results in less coordination (larger variance) of e↵ort choices
within groups.
Again, group composition has a strong influence on how groups behave; those with a
higher share of women have much less dispersed e↵ort levels and a lower e↵ort variance.
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OLS Random E↵ects GLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
varagg varagg varagg varaggt varaggt varaggt
loss contract 1.127 1.430⇤ 2.533⇤⇤⇤ 0.587 0.686⇤ 0.986⇤⇤⇤
(0.715) (0.758) (0.790) (0.428) (0.410) (0.230)
female ratio –3.082⇤⇤ –2.188 -7.088⇤⇤ –1.351⇤ –0.538 –3.024⇤⇤⇤
(1.459) (1.792) (2.369) (0.809) (0.932) (0.595)
avg risk aversion –0.461 0.211 –0.422⇤ 0.0845
(0.508) (0.568) (0.230) (0.173)
avg loss aversion 0.455⇤ 0.244 0.242⇤ 0.305⇤⇤
(0.237) (0.308) (0.127) (0.122)
avg ambiguity aversion 0.440 0.760 0.198 0.240
(0.475) (0.485) (0.194) (0.175)
avg CRT –0.311 –0.237 –0.249⇤⇤⇤ –0.198⇤⇤
(0.214) (0.228) (0.0868) (0.0815)
avg extraversion 1.095⇤ 0.932⇤⇤⇤
(0.568) (0.159)
avg conscientiousness –1.584⇤⇤ –0.534⇤⇤
(0.629) (0.250)
avg agreeableness –0.294 –0.455⇤
(0.628) (0.270)
avg neuroticism 0.445 0.0243
(0.491) (0.259)
avg openness –0.191 –0.0792
(0.469) (0.181)
constant 3.556⇤⇤⇤ 0.828 –1.011 1.973⇤⇤⇤ 2.745 –1.092
(0.743) (3.758) (6.188) (0.442) (2.038) (2.357)
N 24 24 24 240 240 240
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Table 3: Analysis of the aggregate variance in e↵ort choices using OLS and random e↵ects GLS. All





























(b) Payo↵s per Period
Figure 2: Payo↵s. The left panel presents the boxplots for the payments across treatments. The right
panel disaggregates the data by period and treatment.
In this section we analyze how loss contracts a↵ect subjects’ payo↵s. To do so, we
first plot in the left panel of Figure 2 the per-period payo↵ of all subjects across both
treatments. The figure shows that the median per-period payo↵ is higher under gain
contracts than under loss contracts. In fact, the median payo↵ across all periods under
loss contracts is 70 experimental units, exactly equal to the payo↵ of the risk-dominant
equilibrium (i.e., e↵ort level 1).4,5 We mark the payo↵ of 70 experimental units with a
horizontal red line in Figure 2.
In the right panel of Figure 2 we plot subjects’ payo↵s for each period. The panel
shows that under loss contracts, the median payo↵ is of 70 experimental units in each
single period, while it is greater than 70 in most periods under gain contracts. Another
interesting feature of this panel in Figure 2 is how the variance in payo↵s seems to decrease
as the experiment advances under loss contracts but not under gain contracts.
To quantify the e↵ects of loss contracts on payo↵s, in Table 4 we present two random
e↵ects models. The left table shows how the framing of contracts and subjects’ personality
traits a↵ect individual payo↵s. In the right table we study the e↵ects of contract framing
and group composition on payo↵s. Both models confirm our above result; a loss contract
4There are other combinations by which a subject might get 70 experimental units. However, exerting
the minimum e↵ort is the only way a subject can guarantee these 70 experimental units.
5Figure 4 in the appendix shows the same plot as Figure 2 but is disaggregated by gender. In it, we
see how with the median payo↵ for women is higher under both gain and loss contracts.
11



























Standard errors in parentheses






avg risk aversion –5.675
(3.852)
avg ambiguity aversion –1.498
(4.567)

















Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Table 4: Random e↵ects GLS. All standard errors are clustered at the group level.
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is detrimental to subjects’ payo↵s. This is especially significant once we control for group
characteristics rather than individual ones.
Again, we find significant gender e↵ects for payo↵s. First, women generate higher
individual payo↵s than their male counterparts (left table of Table 4). Second, those
groups with a higher share of women see significantly higher individual payo↵s for all
group members (right table of Table 4).
Result 3: A loss contract results in lower payo↵s.
To gain a better understanding of this result, we take a closer look at the single
determinants of payo↵s. According to the payo↵ function (1), subject i’s payo↵s in period
t depend positively on the group output determined by the minimum e↵ort exerted by
subject i’s group at period t (mine↵ortg,t), and they depend negatively on the excess e↵ort
provided by subject i at period t above the group’s minimum e↵ort. The reason for the
latter is that whenever a subject exerts a higher e↵ort than the group’s minimum e↵ort
(i.e., ei,t > emin,g,t), the di↵erence between the group’s exerted e↵ort and the minimum
e↵ort is “wasted” and is not used to “produce” any output. To formalize the concept of
wasted e↵ort, we define the wasted e↵ort of each subject i at period t as
wastei,t = ei,t   emin,g,t. (2)
Note that waste i,t can only take positive values, with a minimum of zero whenever a sub-
ject is exerting the group’s minimum e↵ort. Therefore, wastei,t is an important measure
of e ciency that captures the degree to which subjects can coordinate on the same e↵ort
level. Consequently, the payo↵-dominant equilibrium (i.e., e↵ort level 7) is characterized
by zero wasted e↵ort of all group members.
The left and right tables of Table 5 present two random e↵ects models of how indi-
vidual wasted e↵orts are determined by the framing of contracts and by either subjects’
personality traits (left table) or the group composition (right table). In the left table we
see no e↵ects of loss contracts on the level of wasted e↵orts. However, once we control for
group characteristics (right table), loss contracts have a significant and positive e↵ect on
the amount of individual wasted e↵orts.
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Standard errors in parentheses






avg risk aversion –0.0271
(0.127)
avg ambiguity aversion 0.0858
(0.109)

















Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Table 5: Random e↵ects GLS. All standard errors are clustered at the group level.
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Result 4: A loss contract results in a higher amount of wasted e↵orts.
We can therefore conclude that in our setup, loss contracts unambiguously reduce
payo↵s. Moreover, this payo↵ reduction comes through two channels: a decrease in the
minimum e↵ort of groups (Result 1) and an increase the individual level of wasted e↵orts.
4 Gender E↵ects
Given the strong gender e↵ects detected in our analysis, we briefly analyze the influence of
gender despite the fact that the experiment was originally not designed for this purpose.
Our results show that groups with a higher share of women coordinate on higher e↵ort
levels (Table 2) and produce less wasted e↵ort (Table 4), and consequently they have a
higher average payo↵ (Table 4).
Gain Contract Loss Contract













Figure 3: Mean e↵ort decisions by gender and treatment. The left panel shows the mean e↵ort decision
of all women per round (solid line) and the mean e↵ort decisions of all men per round (dashed line) for
gain contracts. The right panel shows the same for loss contracts.
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In Figure 3 we plot the average choices of women and men in each period for both
treatments. The figure shows that most of the gender di↵erences come from the loss
contract treatment. A series of Mann-Whitney tests confirm this. We cannot reject that
women and men exert the same level of e↵ort at the beginning of the session (p-value =
0.342) under gain contracts. However, under a loss contract, we find strong di↵erences in
the e↵ort choices between genders for the session’s first period (Mann-Whitney p-value
= 0.007).6 Moreover, under loss contracts, the di↵erences across gender reverse from the
beginning to the end of the experiment: while men exert significantly more e↵ort in the
first period, by the end of the session, they exert considerably less e↵ort than women.
Such reversion becomes clear in Table 6, where we run a GLS interacting the ratio
of women with the period. The first column shows that gender has no e↵ect on the way
groups’ minimum e↵ort evolves during the session. In the second column, however, we
see a strong positive e↵ect of the interaction between the ratio of women and the period.
In other words, the results of the second column of Table 6 show that as the sessions
progress under loss contracts, groups with a larger proportion of women have a higher
minimum e↵ort.
Our finding from the gain contract treatment that there are no gender di↵erences are
in line with the existing literature on gender e↵ects in coordination games with strategic
complements (e.g., Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2005; Heinemann et al., 2009; Engelmann
and Normann, 2010; Di Girolamo and Drouvelis, 2015). However, the di↵erences we
observe under loss contracts seem to indicate that this might not be a generalizable result.
Unfortunately, our data are not adequate to go beyond these initial indications of gender
e↵ects under loss contracts.7 Yet, we do believe that our data point to some interesting
e↵ects, and we plan on studying them in the future.
6Notice we cannot run a Mann-Whitney using any individual observations beyond the first period, as
they cease to be independent.
7For example, the number of groups composed only of men in control is one, while in treatment it is
three, and no group is composed only of women.
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Gain Contract Loss Contract
periodmine↵ort periodmine↵ort




female ratio ⇥ period 0.0690 0.273⇤⇤⇤
(0.106) (0.0947)
avg risk aversion –3.869 –0.168
(2.414) (0.250)
avg loss aversion 2.018 –0.173⇤⇤
(1.361) (0.0775)
avg ambiguity aversion 2.421 –0.0471
(1.787) (0.181)
avg CRT 2.921⇤⇤⇤ 0.333
(0.743) (0.228)
avg extraversion 4.475⇤⇤⇤ –0.334⇤⇤
(1.248) (0.157)
avg conscientiousness –1.067 0.219
(1.248) (0.364)
avg agreerableness 3.135⇤⇤⇤ 1.319⇤⇤⇤
(0.851) (0.334)
avg neuroticism 2.913⇤⇤⇤ –0.415
(0.846) (0.284)





Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Table 6: Random e↵ects GLS by treatment. In the first column, we use only data from gains contract
sessions; in the second column we use data only for loss contract sessions. The dependent variable is the
minimum e↵ort of each group. All standard errors are clustered at the group level.
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5 Conclusion
Coordination lies at the center of most organizational settings. The timing and quality
of many production chains depend on the coordinated e↵orts of all of its members. From
sophisticated just-in-time inventory systems to co-authored scientific research papers, we
all depend crucially on the chain’s weakest link.
One suggested way to increase e↵ort in the workplace is to present incentives in the
form of loss contracts, where workers are paid a bonus beforehand that they must pay back
later if they do not meet the required productivity threshold. The literature studying such
loss contracts at the individual level is large (e.g., Hossain and List, 2012; DellaVigna and
Pope, 2018; De Quidt, 2017) and, while inconclusive, points toward loss contracts increas-
ing worker productivity. However, in all of these cases, workers know that an increase in
e↵ort is associated with a lower probability of losing the bonus. This might not resem-
ble many organizational settings that require coordination in sophisticated environments
with di↵use responsibilities. In this context, the presence of strategic uncertainty might
push individuals to low e↵ort strategies to reduce their “exposure” to potential losses.
We recreate such an environment in the lab using the highly stylized minimum e↵ort
game (Van Huyck et al., 1990). Our results show that in a minimum e↵ort setup, loss
contracts reduce the minimum e↵ort of groups. This reduction in e↵ort has strong welfare
e↵ects, as groups are less “productive” and their e↵ort levels are less coordinated, resulting
in higher levels of “wasted e↵orts” and therefore lower individual payo↵s.
We also find strong gender e↵ects. Groups with a larger proportion of women have
higher minimum e↵ort levels, are more coordinated, and thus have higher payo↵s. Yet,
these results seem to be driven mostly by gender di↵erences in the loss contract sessions.
Hence, the evidence from the existing literature that gender does not show any e↵ects
in coordination games with strategic complements (e.g., Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2005;
Heinemann et al., 2009; Engelmann and Normann, 2010; Di Girolamo and Drouvelis,
2015) does not seem to generalize to loss contracts.
Numerous studies observe that negatively framed incentives increase participant pro-
ductivity (e.g., Hossain and List (2012), Fryer Jr et al. (2012), and Hong et al. (2015)
in the field and Armantier and Boly (2015), De Quidt (2017), and Hannan et al. (2005)
in the lab. However, in our setup and that of Pierce et al. (2020), negatively framed
incentives deteriorate participants’ productivity. This divergence in results indicates that
18
negatively framed incentives cannot be regarded on their own but instead need to be
evaluated in the context of their environment. Some settings might call for introducing
loss contracts, while in others, implementing clawback policies might result in destructive
results. As the literature stands, there is no general answer to whether loss contracts are
superior to gain contracts. Rather, each particular situation requires a careful study of
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Figure 4: Payo↵ across genders. Boxplots comparing subjects’ payo↵s (vertical axis) across treatment
and gender.
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